By Diego Pautasso & Gaio Doria
The continued crisis facing Brazil has caused deep uncertainties. Internal political and economic problems have worsened with the new interim government led by Michel Temer. The measures adopted by the interim foreign minister José Serra have generated much controversy.
They have not yet not capture the public trust, as shown by their dismal popularity, which are lower in opinion polls than the deposed government. Brazil struggles with under-whelming performance of its currency and stock exchange.
"National Unity" has not been achieved. The main forces - society, intellectuals, lawyers, trade unions and social movements, students and artists - have engaged in massive protests nationwide.
The conservative approach by eliminating important ministries such as Culture, Communications, Agricultural Development, Women, Racial Equality and Human Rights, have sparked fierce public backlash, propelling the nation to split further.
Within weeks in office, the interim government has already endured numerous scandals. Romero Jucá - Minister of Planning and main political articulator - and Fabiano Silveira - Minister of Transparency - were exonerated due to leaked recordings that revealed the political plot behind the coup, exposing the world to the innards of national politics.
Several other members of the interim government are under investigation. The Coup d'état narrative is largely supported by international media outlets that claimed a lack of legitimacy of the interim government. Several heads of state have not recognized the new government or keeping a distance, which points to a weakness of the impeachment process.
At the European parliament, some deputies petitioned for the European Union to halt negotiations with the interim government. The General Secretary of the Organization of American States (OAS), Luis Almagro, stated that what occurred in Brazil was a coup.
Similar reactions were expressed by the General Secretary of UNASUL, Ernesto Samper and from the governments of Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Pope Francis expressed concerns about "white coups" occurring in Latin America at the risk of social conflicts in countries such as Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina.
The measures of interim chancellor Serra are extreme. Brazil's Foreign Ministry has repudiated declarations issued by UNASUL and other Latin American governments, which set the tone of a new diplomatic approach for the region.
Itamaraty's decision of obliging Brazilian diplomats to fight against the coup narrative reveals weak legitimacy of his government.
Serra ordered a study about the costs of sustaining embassies in African and Caribbean countries, signaling a willingness to close them. However, diplomatic missions located in neutral nations in Europe are not under the same scrutiny.
An inability to understand the strategic importance – in the economic, diplomatic and security levels - of regional integration and Brazil-Africa relations shows that Brazil's foreign policy will turn towards old paradigms.
The Chinese have traditionally embraced a pragmatic strategy to consolidate partnerships, mixing cautious behavior with the diplomatic principle of non-intervention in internal affairs.
Yet, Brazil's crisis remains fraught in uncertainty with the consequences that will be felt in international relations with its main trading partner, China. Brazil-China relations fall into distinct perspectives.
During Lula and Dilma's administrations, a solid strategic partnership was forged with the creation of the (COSBAN-2004), the signatures of several Joint Action Plans (2010-2014; 2015-2021), the Ten Years Cooperation Plan (2001-15) and promotion of bilateral relations from "Strategic Partner (1993) to Global Strategic Partner (2012). Between 2001 and 2015, commerce went from US$ 3.2 billions to US$ 66.3 billions, resulting in China becoming Brazil's largest trade partner in 2009.
Both countries are partners for reshaping the international order through the BRICS platform and AIIB. The Brazilian government directed by center-left forces was a major partner for China's global vision.
Yes, the interim government does seek to boost trade and attract more Chinese investment to the country, does it have a willingness to defend national industries, such as oil and civil construction, with their respective market reserves, as well as smaller bargains with regards to market access to counterparts for foreign investments.
The forces supporting the interim government appear to represent short-term pragmatic gains. However, such gains may be overshadowed by Temer's government tendency to strengthen the South-North axis of Brazilian diplomacy, decreasing emphasis on BRICS and prioritizing partnerships with the US and EU, including free trade agreements.
While bilateral trade should not suffer any impact, important bilateral strategic projects could end up in the hands of third parties. According to a document prepared by the interim foreign ministry to embark on a new "old" foreign policy, Brazil wants closer partnerships with the US and neo-liberal Argentina.
Nevertheless, China is the first trading partner of Brazil, but there's a clear sign that the interim government would dispense with them. Beijing’s efforts to move towards a strategic partnership with Brazil may soon cease to exist as the new multi-polar order for South America’s largest nation is headed towards renewed ties with Washington.
Diego Pautasso has a Ph.D. in Political Science, currently a professor of International Relations at ESPM South and UNISINOS universities, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasil.
Gaio Doria is a Ph.D. candidate at Renmin University of China, Beijing, China.
( The opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the opinions of Panview or CCTV.com. )
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